Secure direct communication using step-split Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
  pair by Cai, Qing-yu
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
03
11
05
5v
2 
 1
 A
pr
 2
00
4
Secure direct communication using step-split Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pair
Qing-yu Cai
Wuhan Institute of Physics and Mathematics, Chinese Academy of Science,
Wuhan 430071, People’s Republic of China
We presen a secure direct communication protocol by using step-split Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) pair. In this communication protocol, Alice first sends one qubit of an EPR pair to Bob.
Bob sends a receipt signal to Alice through public channel when he receives Alice’s first qubit. Alice
performs her encoding operations on the second qubit and sends this qubit to Bob. Bob performs a
Bell-basis measurement to draw Alice’s information. The security of this protocol is based on ‘High
fidelity implies low entropy’. If Eve want to eavesdrop Alice’s information, she has to attack both
qubits of the EPR pair, which results in that any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected.
Bob’s receipt signal can protect this protocol against the eavesdropping hiding in the quantum
channel losses. And this protocol is strictly secure to perform a quantum key distribution by using
Calderbank-shor-steane codes.
Quantum cryptography (QC) or quantum key distribution (QKD) exploits the principles of quantum mechanics to
enable secure distribution of private information. In a QKD protocol, if the sender (Alice) wishes to send message
to receiver (Bob), Alice should first encode her message on the travel qubit(s) and Bob should perform a decoding
measurement on the travel qubit(s) to gain Alice’s message. To perfectly complete the QKD, a reliable public channel
is needed. The security of the resulting key is guaranteed by the properties of quantum information, and thus
is conditioned only on fundamental laws of physics being correct. Since Bennett and Brassard proposed the first
QKD protocol in 1984 [1], a lot of theoretical QKD protocol have been advanced [1-12]. The aim of these QKD
protocols to establish a common random key between two parties. Beige et al. first proposed a quantum secure direct
communication (QSDC) scheme [13] in which the message can be read only after a transmission of an additional
classical information for each qubit. In Ref.[14], Bostro¨m and Felbinger presented a ping-pong protocol which allows
the information to be transmitted in a direct way, i.e., which does not needs to establish a random key to encrypt
messages. And the ping-pong protocol has been extended by using single photon in a mixed state [15]. In this paper,
we show a communication protocol with a strict security proof, which allows information transferred in two-step and
one local operation encoding two bit information by using step-split EPR pair. Actually, the basic idea that one
bit information can be transferred in two-step was presented in Ref.[6]. Two localized wave packets encoded one bit
information are sent from Alice to Bob along two separated channels. And that one local operation can encode two
bits information is well known as dense encoding [5].
Let us first start with a brief description of a secure direct communication presented by Deng et al. recently [16].
Alice prepares an order N EPR pair in the state |ψ− >. Alice sends half of each EPR pair to Bob. Alice and Bob
randomly select some of the EPR pairs to check Eve’s eavesdropping and other ERP pairs to transfer information.
When Alice believes that the communication is secure, she performs a unitary operation on the qubit she kept to encode
two classical bits and sends this qubit to Bob. Bob performs a Bell-basis measurement to decode Alice’s information.
Unfortunately, there are many loopholes in there secrrity proof. Eve can not gain any of Alcie’s information if she only
attack the first qubit. Second, equation (21) is wrong because that the basis {|0, ε00 >, |1, ε01 >, |1, ε00 >, |0, ε01 >}
are not mutual orthogonal in general. So the resulting conclusion is unreliable. As is well explained in the ping-pong
protocol [14], dense coding feature has to be abandoned in favor of a secure transmission on this occasion ( Actually,
the capacity of the ping-pong protocol can be improved doubly with another security proof. [17]).
As is well known, an ERP pair can be in one of the four Bell states,
|φ+ > = 1√
2
(|0 > |0 > +|1 > |1 >)
=
1√
2
(|+ > |+ > +|− > |− >), (1)
|φ− > = 1√
2
(|0 > |0 > −|1 > |1 >)
=
1√
2
(|+ > |− > +|− > |+ >), (2)
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|ψ+ > = 1√
2
(|0 > |1 > +|1 > |0 >)
=
1√
2
(|+ > |+ > −|− > |− >), (3)
|ψ− > = 1√
2
(|0 > |1 > −|1 > |0 >)
=
1√
2
(|+ > |− > −|− > |+ >), (4)
where |+ >= 1√
2
(|0 > +|1 >), |− >= 1√
2
(|0 > −|1 >), and |0 >, |1 > are the up and down eigenstate of the σz . It
is well known that such EPR pairs can be used to establish nonlocal correlations over a spacelike interval. But these
correlations cannot be used for superluminal communication. Consider Alice has an EPR pair in the singlet state
|ψ− >. She sends one qubit to Bob and keeps another. Assume both Alice and Bob perform measurement on their
qubits in basis Bz , Bz = {|0 >, |1 >}. When Alice’s measurement outcome is |0 >, then she immediately knows Bob’s
measurement outcome is |1 >. If Alice’s measurement outcome is |1 >, then she knows Bob’s measurement outcome
is |0 >. But whether Alice’s measurement outcome is |0 > or |1 > is completely random with a probability p = 0.5.
As long as one of them performs a measurement, the state |ψ− > will instantaneously collapse to a product state
|0 >A |1 >Bor |1 >A |0 >B randomly. The correlations do not exist any longer. So Bob can not get any of Alice’s
message through these processes. In order to sends message from Alice to Bob, a reliable public channel is needed.
When two qubits (A and B) are in the maximally entangled states |ψ± > and |φ± >, each single qubit is in the
completely mixed states, ρ±A := trB{|ψ± >< ψ±|} = trB{|φ± >< φ±|}. No one can distinguish these states by an
experiment performed on only one qubit. In other words, one qubit can be encoded by a local operation but it has a
nonlocal effect. Anyone who only access to one of the qubits can not decode the information if he has no access to
the other qubit. Suppose Alice has an EPR pair in the state |ψ− >. She sends one qubit (we call it ‘the first qubit’)
to Bob and keeps another. When Bob receives the first qubit, he sends a signal to Alice through public channel (we
call this as Bob’s receipt). If Alice receives Bob’s receipt, she then performs an encoding operation U on her qubit
and then sends this qubit (we call this qubit as ‘the second qubit’) to Bob. Bob performs a Bell-basis measurement
on two qubits to decode Alice’s information. Alice’s encoding operation U can be described by
U00 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, U01 =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
U10 =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, U11 =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (5)
These four operations can transform the state |ψ− > into |ψ− >, |ψ+ >, |φ− >, and |φ+ >, respectively. These
operations respectively correspond to the code 00, 01, 10, 11. To ensure the security of this communication, a check
mode is needed. When Alice receives Bob’s receipt, instead of her encoding operation, she performs a measurement
in the basis Bz = {|0 >, |1 >} or Bx = {|+ >, |− >)} randomly. Then she tells her measurement outcome to Bob.
Bob also performs a measurement in the same basis as Alice used. If both outcomes coincide, they known that Eve
is in line. This communication stops. Else, Alice prepares next EPR pair. This protocol an explicit described like an
algorithm.
(1) Alice prepares an EPR pair in state |ψ− >.
(2) Alice sends one qubit to Bob and keeps another.
(3) Bob receives the first qubit and sends a classical signal to Alice.
(4) When Alice receives Bob’s receipt, she select encoding operation (5e) or checking measurement (5c) randomly.
(5c) Alice performs a measurement in basis Bz or Bx randomly. She tells Bob her measurement result to Bob
through public channel. Bob also performs a measurement in the basis Alice used. If both measurement
outcomes coincide, there is Eve in line. This communication stops. Else, this communication continues.
(5e) Alice performs an encoding operation. She sends the second qubit to Bob. Bob receives the second qubit. He
performs a Bell-basis measurement on two qubits to decode Alice’s information.
(6) When all of Alice’s information is transmitted, Alice and Bob announce some codes as message authentification.
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(7) This communication successfully terminated.
Security proof . Since ρ±A := trB{|ψ± >< ψ±|} = trB{|φ± >< φ±|}, Eve can not distinguish each Bell state if
she only attack one qubit of the EPR pair, i.e., Eve can not get any information if she only attack the second qubit.
Because Alice decides to perform check measurement only after Bob received the first qubit, the security proof has to
assure Eve’s any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected. To gain Alice’s information, Eve has to attack both
qubits of the EPR pair. Suppose after Eve’s first attack, the state Alice and Bob shared becomes ρ. The information
Eve can gain from ρ is bounded by the Holevo quantity χ(ρ) [18]. Because Holevo quantity decreases under quantum
operations [18,19], the mutual information Eve can gain after Alice’s encoding operation is determined by χ(ρ). From
χ(ρ) = S(ρ)−
∑
i
piS(ρi), (6)
we know S(ρ) is the upper bound of χ(ρ). ‘High fidelity implies low entropy’. The fidelity [20] of state |ψ− > and ρ is
F (|ψ− >, ρ) =
√
< ψ−|ρ|ψ− >. (7)
Let us assume that
F (|ψ− >, ρ)2 =< ψ−|ρ|ψ− >= 1− γ, (8)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Therefore, the entropy of ρ is bounded above by the entropy of a diagonal density matrix ρmax with
diagonal entries 1− γ, γ
3
, γ
3
, γ
3
. And the entropy of ρmax is
S(ρmax) = −(1− γ) log2(1− γ)− γ log2
γ
3
. (9)
So S(ρmax) is a upper bound of the information Eve can gain from ρ. Let us discuss the connection between the
information Eve can gain and the detection probability d. In check mode, when Alice and Bob share the state |φ± >,
their measurement outcomes will coincide every time when they use the measurement basis Bz. When the state they
shared is |ψ+ >, their measurement outcomes will coincide every time when they use the measurement basis Bx. If
and only if the state they shared is |ψ− >, their measurement results will never coincide. Since F (|ψ− >, ρ)2 = 1− γ,
then the detection probability is d ≥ γ/2. From equation (9) we know when γ = 0, i.e., Eve does not eavesdrop the
communication, the detection probability d = 0. When γ > 0, i.e., Eve can gain some of Alice’s information, she has
to face a nonzero risk d > 0 to be detected. When γ = 3
4
, it has S(ρmax) = 2, which implies that Eve has a chance to
eavesdrop full of Alice’s information. In fact, Eve can reach this upper bound. She replaces Alice’s first qubit with
one of her own and forwards it to Bob. When she receives the seconds qubit, she performs a Bell-basis measurement
on both qubits to draw full of Alice’s information. On this occasion, the detection rate is d ≥ 3
8
.
Eve can attack the communication without eavesdropping [21]. She only attack the second qubit to destroy the
communication. In this case, Eve can not gain Alice’s information. After Alice’s encoding operation, Eve captures the
second qubit and performs a measurement in the basis Bx or Bz on it, which makes the state of the EPR pair collapse
to a product state. Eve also can perform a unitary operation on the second qubit. She can performs the operation
U01, U10, or U11 on every second qubit to attack the communication. Then Eve forwards the seconds qubit to Bob.
When the communication is terminated, Bob has learned nothing but a sequence of nonsense random bits. Alice and
Bob can use a message authentification method to protect the communication against Eve’s denial-of-service attack
with a reliable public channel [21].
Consider that the quantum channel is noisy. Noise in quantum channel will introduce qubit losses and qubit
errors. In a noisy quantum channel, Eve’s eavesdropping may be hidden in the quantum channel losses. In our
communication protocol, Bob sends a receipt in every run. Without this signal, quantum channel losses may be
used by Eve to eavesdrop Alice’s information [22]. Eve can keeps the first qubit for a time. If Alice publish her
measurement outcome, Eve then forwards the first qubit to Bob. Else, Eve receives the second qubit and performs a
Bell-basis measurement to draw Alice’s information. Thus, such eavesdropping can be hidden in the quantum channel
losses without Bob’s receipt signal. Alice and Bob can use the message authentification method to detect Eve’s
eavesdropping hidden in qubit error. If Alice and Bob find the error rate is higher than they desired, they abandon
this communication. With a low noise channel, Alice and Bob can use Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes [23] to
complete a perfect secure communication. In this way, our protocol is similar to the modified Lo-Chau protocol [24].
It is strictly secure to complete a key distribution.
In summary, we present a secure direct quantum communication based on step-split EPR pair. In principle, this
protocol allows quasisecure direct communication and secure QKD. In practice, the storage of one photon is necessary
for a duration corresponding to the distance between Alice and Bob [25]. Today, the Bell state of an EPR photons can
be created by parametric down − conversion. And the complete Bell type measurement is also been demonstrated
[26]. The values of σx, σy , and σz of a qubit of an single photon can be ascertained [27]. With current technologies,
the experimental realization of the protocol is feasible with relative small effort.
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